Currently, there is renewed interest in the prob lem, raised by Shafer in 1985, of updating proba bilities when observations are incomplete (or set valued). This is a fundamental problem, and of particular interest for Bayesian networks. Re cently, Griinwald and Halpern have shown that commonly used updating strategies fail here, ex cept under very special assumptions. We propose a new rule for updating probabilities with in complete observations. Our approach is deliber ately conservative: we make no or weak assump tions about the so-called incompleteness mecha nism that produces incomplete observations. We model our ignorance about this mechanism by a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the the ory of imprecise probabilities, and we derive a new updating rule using coherence arguments. In general, our rule produces lower posterior prob abilities, as well as partially determinate deci sions. This is a logical consequence of the igno rance about the incompleteness mechanism. We show how the new rule can properly address the apparent paradox in the 'Monty Hall' puzzle. In addition, we apply it to the classification of new evidence in Bayesian networks constructed using expert knowledge. We provide an exact algo rithm for this task with linear-time complexity, also for multiply connected nets.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the problem of updating probabilities with observations that are incomplete, or set valued. To our knowledge, this problem was first given se rious consideration in 1985 by Shafer [12] . He showed that it is at the heart of well-known puzzles, such as the Monty
•A longer version with proofs is available [2] .
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IDSIA Galleria 2, 6928 Manno (Lugano) Switzerland zaffalon@ idsia.ch Hall puzzle. Moreover, his main argument was that the right way to update probabilities with incomplete observa tions requires knowledge of the incompleteness mechanism (called protocol in Shafer's paper), i.e., the mechanism that is responsible for turning a complete observation into an incomplete one, and he rightly observed that "we do not always have protocols in practical problems".
In practise, people often assume a condition known as coarsening at random (CAR [4] ), or its specialisation to missing data problems, called missing at random (MAR [8] ). These represent a form of partial knowledge about the incompleteness mechanism. Remarkably, when CAR holds, the common conditioning rule updates probabili ties correctly. This may be one reason that Shafer's work seems to have been largely overlooked until 2002, 1 when an interesting paper by Grunwald and Halpern [5] offered a renewed perspective of the subject. This work argues strongly that CAR holds rather infrequently, and it enforces Shafer's viewpoint concerning the difficulties in knowing and modelling the incompleteness mechanism. These two points taken together raise a fundamental issue in probabil ity theory, which also presents a serious problem for appli cations: how should beliefs be updated when there is little or no information about the incompleteness mechanism?
We believe that the first step is to allow for ignorance about the mechanism in our models. This is the approach that we take in this paper. In Section 3, we make our model as conservative as possible by representing the ignorance about the incompleteness mechanism by a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the theory of imprecise probabilities2 [ 14] . This theory is a generalisation of the Bayesian theory of probability [3] , with a closely related behavioural inter pretation, and based on similar criteria of rationality. Be cause we are aware that readers may not be familiar with imprecise probability models, we present a brief discus1But see the discussion by Walley in [14, Section 6.11], which has been a source of inspiration for the present work; and some papers by Halpern et at. [6, 7] .
2See [15] for a gentle introduction to imprecise probabilities with emphasis on artificial intelligence.
sion in Section 2, with pointers to the relevant literature. Loosely speaking, the vacuous lower prevision is equiva lent to the set of all distributions, i.e., it makes all incom pleteness mechanisms possible a priori. Our basic model follows from this as a necessary consequence, using the ra tionality requirement of coherence (a generalisation of the requirements of rationality in Bayesian probability theory [3] ). We illustrate how our basic model works by address ing the Monty Hall puzzle, showing that the apparent para dox vanishes if the available knowledge about the incom pleteness mechanism is properly modelled.
We then apply our method for dealing with incomplete ob servations to the special case of a classification problem, where objects are assigned to classes on the basis of the values of their attributes. The question we deal with in Sec tions 4--6, is how cla�sification should be done when values for some of the attributes are missing. We derive a new rule for updating, called conservative updating rule, that allows us to deal with such missing data without making unwarranted assumptions about the mechanism that pro duces them. Our rule leads to an imprecise posterior, and it may lead to inferences that are partially indeterminate. Our method will assign an object to a number of classes, rather than to a single class, unless conditions justify pre cision. This generalised way to do classification is called credal classification in [16] . Arguably this is the best our system can do, given the information that is incorporated into it. Also, any additional information about the missing data mechanism will lead to a new classification that refines ours, but can never contradict it by assigning an object to a class that was not among our optimal classes.
We then apply the conservative updating rule to classifi cation problems with Bayesian networks. We regard a Bayesian net as a tool that formalises expert knowledge and is used to classify new evidence, i.e., to select certain val ues of a class variable given evidence about the attribute values. We develop an exact algorithm for credal classi fication with Bayesian nets that is linear in the number of children of the class node, also for multiply connected nets. This is an important result: it makes the new rule immedi ately available for applications; and it shows that it is pos sible for the power of robust, conservative, modelling to go hand in hand with easy computation, even with multi ply connected networks, where the most common tasks are NP-hard. 2 
Imprecise probabilities
The theory of coherent lower previsions (also called the theory of imprecise probabi lities) [ 14] is an extension of the Bayesian theory of (precise) probability [3] . It models a subject's uncertainty by looking at his dispositions toward taking certain actions, and imposing requirements of ratio nality, or consistency, on these dispositions.
To make this more clear, consider a random variable X that may take values in a finite set X. A gamble f on X is a real valued function on X. It associates areward j(x) with any possible value x of X. If a subject is uncertain about the value of X, he will be disposed to accept certain gambles, and to reject others, and we may model his uncertainty by looking at which gambles he accepts (or rejects).
In the Bayesian theory of uncertainty (see for instance [3] ), it is assumed that a subject can always specify a fa ir pri ce, or prevision, P(J) for j, whatever the information avail able to him. P(J) is the unique real number such that he (i) accepts to buy the gamble f for a price p, for all p < P(f); and (ii) accepts to sell the gamble f for a price q, for all q > P(J). In other words, it is essentially assumed that for any real number r, the available information allows the subject to decide which of t.' Ie following two options he prefers: buying f for price r, or selling f for that price.
It has been argued extensively [ 14] that, especially if little information is available about X, there may be prices r for which a subject may have no real preference between these two options, or in other words, that on the basis of the available information he remains undecided about whether to buy f or price r or to sell it for that price: he may not be disposed to do either. If, as the Bayesian theory requires, the subject should choose between these two actions, his choice will then not be based on any real preference: it will be arbitrary, and not a realistic reflection of the subject's dispositions, based on the available information.
The theory of imprecise probabilities remedies this by al lowing a subject to specify two numbers: P(j) and P(j).
His lower prevision P(j) for f is the greatest real num ber p such that he is disposed to buy the gamble f for all prices strictly smaller than p, and his upper prevision P(j) for f is the smallest real number q such that he is disposed to sell f for all prices strictly greater than q. For any r between P(J) and P(j), the subject does not express a preference between buying or selling f for price r. Since selling a gamble f for price r is the same thing as buy ing -f for price -r, we have the conjugacy relationship P(J) = -P(-f) between lower and upper previsions. Whatever we say about upper previsions can always be re formulated in terms of lower previsions. We therefore con centrate on lower previsions. It suffices for our purposes to consider lower previsions P that are defined on the set .C(X) of all gambles on X, i.e., P is considered as a func tion that maps any gamble f on X to the real number P(f).
An event A is a subset of X, and it will be identified with its indicator function lA· We denote P(IA) by P(A) and call it the lower probabi lity of the event A. It is the supremum rate for which the subject is disposed to bet on the event A; and similarly for the upper probability P(A) = P(IA) = 1-E.( co A). Thus, events are special gambles, and lower probabilities are special cases of lower previsions. We use the more general language of gambles, because Walley [ 14] has shown that in the context of imprecise probabilities, it is much more expressive and powerful.
Since lower previsions represent a subject's dispositions to act in certain ways, they should satisfy certain criteria that ensure that these dispositions are rational. Coherence is the strongest such requirement that is considered in the the ory of imprecise probabilities. For a detailed definition and motivation, we refer to [14] . For our purposes, it suffices to expose the connections between coherent lower previ sions and linear previsions, which are the coherent previ sions in de Finetti's sense [3] . A linear prevision P on ,G(X) is a real-valued map on L(X) satisfying the following properties: (i) minxEX f(x)::; P(f) ::; maxxEX f(x); (ii) P(f +g) = P(f)+P(g); and (iii) P(.\f) = .\P(f); for all f and g in ,G(X), and all real numbers .\. Any linear previ sion Pis completely determined by its so-called mass func tion p, defined by p(x) = P( { x} ), since it follows from the axioms that for any gamble f, P(f) = I: xEX f(x)p(x).
We denote the set of all linear previsions on £(X) by P(X).
Linear previsions are the so-called precise probability mod els, which will turn out to be special cases of the more gen eral coherent imprecise probability models.
With any lower prevision P on £(X), we can associate its set of dominating linear previsions:
It turns out that a lower prevision E on ,G (X) is coher ent if and only if M(P) of 0, and if moreover P is the lower envelope of M(E_): for all gambles f on X, E_(f) = inf { P(f) : P E M(P) }. Conversely, the lower envelope E of any non-empty subset M of P(X) is a coher ent lower prevision. This tells us that working with coher ent lower previsions is equivalent to working with sets of linear previsions. Observe that for a coherent E_, we have that
There is a class of coherent lower previsions that deserves special attention. Consider a non-empty subset B of X. Then the vacuous lower prevision P B relative to B is de fined by E_8(f) = infxEB f(x) for all gambles f on X.
Verify that P 8 is a coherent lower prevision, and more over JYf(£8) = { P E P(X): P( B) = 1}. This tells us that P 8 is the smallest (most conservative) coherent lower prevision Eon , G(X) that satisfies P(B) = 1. E_(B) = 1 means that it is practically certain to the subject that X as sumes a value in B, since he is prepared to bet at all odds on this event. Thus, P 8 is the appropriate model for the piece of information that 'X assumes a value in B' and no thing more: any other coherent lower prevision P that satisfies P(B) = 1 dominates P 8, and therefore repre sents stronger behavioural dispositions than those required by coherence and this piece of information alone.
To introduce the concept of a conditional lower prevision, consider any gamble h on X and any value y in the finite set 1i of possible values for another random variable Y. A subject's conditional/ower prevision E_(hiY = y), also de noted as P(hly), is his lower prevision for h if he knew in addition that the variable Y assumes the value y (and noth ing more!). We denote by P(hjY) the gamble on 1i that assumes the value E_(h!Y = y) = P(hly) in y E 11. We can for the purposes of this paper assume that E_( hi Y) is defined for all gambles h on X, and we call E_( ·I Y) a condi tional lower prevision on ,G(X). Observe that P(-IY) maps any gamble h on X to the gamble P(hiY) on 11. Condi tional lower previsions should of course also satisfy certain rationality criteria. £(-IY) is called separately coherent if for all y E 11, P (·I y) is a coherent lower prevision on ,G(X).
If besides the (separately coherent) conditional lower pre vision P( ·IY) on ,G (X), the subject has also specified a co herent (unconditional) lower prevision P on ,G(X x 11), then P and P( ·IY) should in addition satisfy the consistency cri terion of joint coherence. A discussion of this rationality requirement is beyond the scope of this paper, but we refer to [14, Chapter 6] for a detailed discussion and motivation.
There is an important and interesting procedure, called reg ular extension, that allows us to associate with any coher ent lower prevision P on £(X x 11) a (separately coherent) conditional lower prevision B( ·IY) that is jointly coherent with P:
is the vacuous lower prevision relative to X: B(hly) = in f xEX h(x); and
where h is any gamble on X. Thus, B(hly) can be ob tained by applying Bayes' rule (whenever possible) to all the precise previsions in M(E_), and then taking the infi mum! Regular extension has been called divisive condi tioning by Seidenfeld et a!.
[II]. The regular extension is the smallest (most conservative) conditional lower previ sion that is coherent with the joint P and satisfies an addi tional regularity condition [ 14, Appendix J].
We end this section with a discussion of decision-making using lower previsions. Suppose we have two actions a and b, whose outcome depends on the actual value that the variable X assumes in X. Let us denote by fa the gam ble on X representing the uncertain reward resulting from action a: a subject who takes action a receives fa(x) if the value of X turns out to be x. Similar remarks hold for fb· If the subject is uncertain about the value of X, it is not immediately clear which of the two actions he should prefer, unless fa point-wise dominates !b or vice versa, which we shall assume is not the case. Suppose that he has modelled this uncertainty by a coherent lower previ sion on £(X). Then he strictly prefers action a to action b, which we denote as a > b, if he is willing to pay some strictly positive amount in order to exchange the (uncer tain) rewards of b for those of a. Using the behavioural definition of the lower prevision P, this can be written as
If Pis a linear prevision P, this is equivalent to P(Ja) > P(Jb): the subject strictly prefers the action with the highest expected reward. It is easy to see that P(Ja -fb) > 0 can also be written as (VP E M.(P))(P(Ja) > P(Jb)). In other words, a > b iff action a yields a higher expected reward than b for every linear prevision compatible with P. 3 
Incomplete observations
We are now ready to describe our basic model for dealing with incomplete observations. Consider a random variable X that may assume values in a finite set X. Suppose that we have some model for the available information about what value X will assume in X. which takes the form of a coher ent lower prevision Eo defined on ,C (X). We now receive additional information about the value of X by observing the value that another random variable 0 assumes in a fi nite set <9. Only, these observations are incomplete in the following sense: the value of 0 does not allow us to iden tify the value of X uniquely. In fact, the only information we have about the relationship between X and 0 is the fol lowing: if we know that X assumes the value x in X, then we know that 0 must assume a value in a non-empty sub set r(x) of <9, and nothing more! This idea of modelling incomplete observations through a so-called multi-valued map r essentially goes back to Strassen [13] .
If we observe the value o of 0, then we know something more about X: it can then only assume values in the set {o}* = {x EX: o E f(x)} of those values of X that may produce the observation 0 = o. Unless { o} * is a single ton, the observation 0 = o does not allow us to identify a unique value for X; it only allows us to restrict the possi ble values of X to { o} *. The question we want to answer here, is how we can use the new information that 0 = o to coherently update the prior lower prevision Eo on ,C(X) to aposterior lower prevision P(
In order to do this, we need to model the available informa tion about the relationship between X and 0, i.e., about the so-called incompleteness mechanism that turns the values of X into their incomplete observations 0. In the special case that Eo is a (precise) linear prevision Po (with mass function Po), it is often assumed that this mechanism obeys the CAR condition: p(olx) = p(ol y) for all o E <9 and all x andy in {o}* such thatp0(x) > 0 andpo(Y) > 0 (see [4, 5] for an extensive discussion and detailed references). It is assumed that the probability of observing 0 = o is not affected by the specific values x of X that may actually lead to this observation o. However, Grunwald and Halpern [5] have argued convincingly that CAR is a very strong as sumption, that will only be justified in very special cases.
We want to refrain from making such unwarranted assump tions in general: we want to find out what can be said about the posterior P(-10) if no assumptions are made about the incompleteness mechanism, apart from those present in the definition of the multi-valued map r. This implies that any one making additional assumptions (such as CAR) about the incompleteness mechanism will find results that are compatible but stronger, i.e., will find a posterior (lower) prevision that point-wise dominates ours.
We have argued in the previous section that the appropriate model for the piece of information that '0 assumes a value in f(x)' is the vacuous lower prevision P q x ) on £,(<9) rel ative to the set f( x). So we can model the relationship between X and 0 through the following (vacuous) condi tional lower prevision P(·IX) on £,(<9), defined by
oEr (x) for any gamble g on <9 and x E X. Using regular extension, we can now find the smallest (most conservative) condi tional lower prevision R(-1 0) that is coherent with Eo and E.(-IX), and satisfies an additional regularity condition.
Let o E <9 and let f be any ga mble on
is the greatest value of JHuch that, with {o}. = {x EX : r(x) = {o}},
Let us now apply the results of this theorem to the well known Monty Hall puzzle. In the Monty Hall game show, there are three doors. One of them leads to a car, and the re maining doors each have a goat behind them. You indicate one door, and the show's host-let us caii him Monty now opens one of the other doors, which has a goat behind it. After this observation, should you choose to open the door that is left, rather than the one you indicated initially?
To solve the puzzle, we formulate it in our language of in complete observations. Label the doors from I to 3, and as sume without loss of generality that you picked door 1. Let the variable X refer to the door hiding the car, then clearly X= {1, 2, 3}. There is a precise prior prevision P0 deter mined by Po(1) = Po(2) = Po(3) = 1/3. If the gamble fa on X represents the uncertain reward received from action a, and similarly for fb, then we are interested in the gam ble fb -f a• which represents the uncertain reward from exchanging action a for action b. This gamble is also in Table 1 , where � > 0 denotes the difference in utility be tween a car and a goat. Then we find that Jl(fb-fa/2) = 0 and ll (fa -!b/2) = -�. This implies that, with the nota tions established at the end of the previous section, a 'f b and b 'f a: the available information does not allow us to say which of the two actions, sticking to door 1 (action a) or choosing door 3 (action b), is to be strictly preferred.
The same conclusion can also be reached as follows. Sup pose first that Monty has decided on beforehand to always open door 3 when the car is behind door 1. Since he has actually opened door 2, the car cannot be behind door 1, and must therefore be behind door 3. In this case, action b is clearly strictly preferable to action a. Next, suppose that Monty has decided on beforehand to always open door 2 when the car is behind door 1. Since he actually opens door 2, there are two equally likely possibilities, namely that the car is behind door 1 or behind door 3. Both actions now have the same expected reward (zero), and none is therefore strictly preferable to the other. Since both possibilities are consistent with the available information, we cannot infer any (robust) strict preference of one action over the other. A similar analysis was made by Halpern [6] .
Observe that since Jl(fb -fa/2) = 0, you almost-prefer b to a, in tbe sense that you are disposed to exchange fa for !b in return for any strictly positive amount. In the case that Monty could also decide not to open any door, a similar analysis tells us that the updated lower previ sion is given by Jl(f/2) = min{f(1), f(3)}, and we get R( fb -/a/2) = ll(fa -!b/2) = -�: neither option is even almost-preferred, let alone strictly preferred, over the other. 4 Missing data in a classification problem
In order to illustrate the practical implications of our model for the incompleteness mechanism, let us in the rest of this paper show how it can be applied in classification prob lems, where objects have to be assigned to a certain class on the basis of tbe values of their attributes.
Let in such a problem e be the set of possible classes that we want to assign objects to. Let A1, ... , An be the sets of possible values for the n attributes on the basis of which we want the classify the objects. We denote their Carte sian product by X = A1 x · · · x An. We consider a class variable C, which is a random variable in e, and attribute variables Ako which are random variables in Ak (k = 1, ... , n). Then-tuple X = (A1, ... , An) is a ran dom variable in X and is called the attributes variable. The available information about the relationship between class and attribute variables is specified by a (prior) linear previ sion Po on .c(e x X).
Classification is done as follows: if the attributes variable X assumes a value x in X, then the available information about the values of the class variable C is clearly given by the conditional linear prevision Po (./x). If, on the basis of the observed value x of the attributes variable X, we decide that some c ' in e is the right class, then we can see this clas sification as an action with an uncertain reward fc•, whose value /c• (c) depends on the actual value c of the class vari able C. The discussion at the end of Section 2 then tells us that an optimal class Copt is one that maximises the ex pected reward PoUc•/x) over all c ' E e. As an example, if we let /c• = I{ c'}• then PoUc• / x) = Po(c'/x), and this pro cedure associates the most probable class with each value x of the attributes.
To make this more clear, let us consider a medical domain, where classification is employed to make a diagnosis. In this case, the classes are possible diseases and each at tribute variable represents a measure with random outcome. For example, attribute variables might represent medical tests, or information about the patient, such as age, gen der, life style, etc. We can regard tbe specific instance of the vector of attribute variables for a patient as a profile by which we characterise the person under examination. The relationship between diseases and profiles is given by a joint mass function on the class and the attribute variables. This induces a linear prevision Po on .c(e x X), according to Section 2. A diagnosis is then obtained by choosing the most probable disease given a profile. Now it may happen that for a patient some of the attribute variables cannot be measured, i.e., they are missing, as when for some reason a medical test cannot be done. In this case the profile is incomplete and we can regard it as the set of all the complete profiles that are consistent with it. The problem that we face is how we should update our confidence about the possible diseases given a set-profile, as the above classification procedure needs profiles to be complete.
In more general terms, we observe or measure the value ak of some of the attribute variables Ak [,(e) . This is what we now set out to do.
We have arrived at a special case of the model in the pre vious section, and the so-called missing data mechanism is a particular instance of the incompleteness mechanism de scribed there. In this special case, it is easy to verify that the general CAR assumption, discussed previously, reduces to what is known in the literature as the MAR assumption [8] . MAR finds appropriate justification in some statistical ap plications, e.g., special types of survival analysis. However, there is strongly motivated criticism about the unjustified wide use of MAR in statistics, and there are well-developed methods based on much weaker assumptions [9] .
As in the previous section, we want to refrain from mak ing any strong assumptions about the mechanism that is behind the generation of missing values. We have argued before that the information in r, i.e., the information about the relationship between X and 0, can be represented by the conditional lower prevision E(·IX) on £,(0), defined by Eq. (1) . We make the following additional irrelevance assumption: for all gambles f on e, E (flx, o) ==Po (fix) for all X E :X and 0 E r(x). (I) Assumption (I) states that, conditional on the attributes variable X, the observations variable 0 is irrelevant to the class. In other words. the observations o E f(x) can in fluence our beliefs on the class only indirectly through the value x of the attributes variable X, i.e., we are actually dealing with a problem of missing information. Note that the assumption is not restrictive in practise: if the fact that an attribute is missing can directly influence our beliefs on the class, then the related state * should not be regarded as missing information, rather, as a possible value of the attribute, and it should be treated accordingly.
We can use regular extension to obtain the conditional lower prevision .R(·IO) on .C(e). It is the smallest (rnost conservative) separately coherent conditional lower previ sion that is jointly coherent with Po and P(·IX), and takes into account the irrelevance assumption (I). 3 Theorem 2 (Conservative updating rule). Assume that irrelevance assumption (I) holds. Let o be any element of 0. If Po({x}) > Ofor all x E {o}*, then R(flo) m in x, oH(x) Po(flx) for all J in .C(e).
Let us now denote by E that part of the attributes variable X that is instantiated, i.e., for which actual values are avail able. We denote its value by e. Let R denote the other part, for whose components values are missing. We denote the set of its possible values by ::R, and a generic element of that set by r. Then with some abuse of notation, o = (c, *),and { o} * == { e} x ::R. We then deduce from Theorem 2 that R(fle,*) ==minP0(fle,r)
for all gambles f on e, provided that Po(e, r) > 0 for all r E ::R, which we shall assume to be the case. We shall call Eq. (2) the conser vati ve updating rule.
In the case of the earlier medical example, e denotes the part of the profile that is known for a patient and the same incomplete profile can be regarded as the set { (e, r) lr E ::R} of complete profiles that are consistent with it. The con servative updating rule tells us that in order to update our beliefs on the possible diseases given the incomplete pro file, we have to consider all the complete profiles consis tent with it, giving rise to lower and upper probabilities and previsions. In tum, this will generally give rise to partial classifications, according to the consideration about deci sion making in Section 2. That is, in general we will only be able to exclude some of the possible diseases given the evidence. This rnay give rise to a single disease, but only when the conditions justify precision.
The conservative updating rule is our main result: it pro vides us with the correct updating rule to use with an un known incompleteness mechanism. It shows that robust, conservative, inference can be achieved by relying only on the original prior model of domain uncertainty.
Classification in expert systems with Bayesian networks
One popular way of doing classification in complex real world domains involves using Bayesian networks (BNs).
These are precise probabilistic models defined by a directed acyclic graph and a collection of conditional mass func tions [10] . A generic node Z in the graph is identified with a random variable. Each variable Z holds a collection Table 2 . (c, a1, ... , an)· Hence, a BN is equivalent to a joint mass function over the variables of the graph. We assume that it assigns a strictly positive probability to any event.
Bayesian nets play an important role in the design of expert systems. Domain experts are supposed to provide both the qualitative graphical structure and the numerical values for the probabilities, thus implicitly defining an overall model of the prior uncertainty for the domain of interest. Users can then query the expert system, resulting in an update of the marginal prior probability of C to a posterior probabil ity according to the available evidence E = e, i.e., a set of nodes with known values. This kind of updating is very useful as it enables users to do classification, as we explain further on. In the Asia net, one might ask for the updated probability of lung cancer (C = c'), given that a patient is a smoker (S = s ' ) and has abnormal X-rays (L = l'), aiming ultimately at finding the proper diagnosis for the patient.
Updating the uncertainty for the class variable in a Bayesian net is subject to the considerations concerning in complete observations in the preceding sections, as gener ally the evidence set E will not contain all the attributes. To address this problem, one can assume that MAR holds and compute p0(cfe), but we have already pointed out that this approach is likely to be problematical in real applications.
Explicitly modelling the missing data mechanism is an other way to cope with the problem, perhaps involving the same Bayesian net. The net would then also comprise the nodes oko k = 1' .. . 'n, for the observations; and the pos terior probability of interest would become p(cfo). Un fortunately, this approach presents serious practical diffi culties. Modelling the mechanism can be as complex as modelling the prior uncertainty. Furthermore, it can be ar gued that in contrast with domain knowledge (e.g., medical knowledge), the way information can be accessed depends on the particular environment where a system will be used; and this means that models of the missing data mechanism will probably not be re-usable, and therefore costly.
These considerations support adopting a robust approach that can be effectively implemented, like the one we pro posed in Section 4. We next develop an algorithm that ex ploits Eq. (2) to perform reliable classification with BNs. 6 
An algorithm to classify incomplete evidence with BNs
How can we use the updated lower prevision P(-fe, * ) to perform classification? As in the case of a precise pos terior Po(·!x), we associate a reward function I{c') with each class c' in e, and we look for those classes c that are undominated elements of the strict partial order > on e, r E :R Po(c'',e,r) (3) where we have used Eq. (2), Bayes' rule, and the assump tion that Po ( e, r) > 0 for all r in�. It is important to realise that the new updating will not always allow two classes to be compared, i.e., Eq. (2) generally produces only a par tial order on the classes. As a consequence, the classifica tion procedure consists in comparing each pair of classes by strict preference (also called credal dominance in [ 16] ) and in discarding the dominated ones. The system will then output a set of possible, undominated classes. Classifiers with this characteristic are also called credal classifiers. In the following we address the efficient computation of the credal dominance test (3) .
Let rr ' and rr" denote values of the parent variables consis tent with (c',e,r) and (c",e,r), respectively. If a node's parents do not contain C, let rr denote the value of the par ent variables consistent with ( e, r ). Furthermore, without loss of generality, let A1, •.
• , Am, m ::; n, be the children of C, and K = {1, . .. , m}. Let B be the Markov blanket of C, t. i }at is, the set of nodes consisting of the parents of C, its children, and the parents of the children of C.
Consider a total order on the children of C that extends the partial order given by the arcs of the graph, i.e., when Ai --+ Aj is interpreted as: Ai precedes Aj in the partial order. By permuting the subscripts we can always say that the total order is just A1 --+ A2 --+ · · · --+ Am. Let Ao = We want to test whether c' credal-dominates c". We start by computing
We have J.LD(t') = min{Z:�, g:�. g:,g:n = 1 and We have J.LL = min { Z:�� 1, g 6� �} = 1. Finally, we com pute
As J.Lc is not greater than 1, c" is undominated.
Testing whether c " credal-dominates c ' is very similar and leads to J.L c = 6�6, so c' is undominated as well. In this situation, the system suspends judgement, i.e., it outputs both the classes, as there is not enough information to allow us to choose between the two. This should be contrasted with traditional updating, which produces Po ( c'll', s ' ) � 0.646, and leads us to diagnose cancer.
It is useful to better analyse the reasons for the indetermi nate output of the proposed system. Given our assump tions, the system cannot exclude that the available evi dence, or incomplete profile, is part of a more complete profile where T = t', D = d', and H = h'. If this were the case, then c " would be nine times as probable a posteriori as c', and we should diagnose no cancer. However, the sys tem cannot exclude either that the more complete profile would beT= t", D = d', and H = h" . In this case, the ratio of the posterior probability of c' to that of c" would be �85 6 , leading us to the opposite diagnosis.
Of course when the evidence is strong enough, the pro posed system does produce determinate conclusions. For instance, the incomplete profile given by L = l', S = s' and T = t', will lead the system to exclude the presence of cancer. 7 
Conclusions
We have proposed a conservative rule for updating proba bilities with incomplete observations when strong assump tions about the incompleteness mechanism cannot be jus tified, thus filling an important gap in literature. We have achieved this result by coherent lower previsions, following an approach very similar in spirit to the Bayesian method. However, imprecise probabilities allowed us to work natu rally also with generalised priors, such as the vacuous prior, which are needed to model states of partial or total igno rance. Generalised priors are significantly more expressive than traditional priors: they enable a new set of difficult important problems to be addressed in an adequate and el egant manner, as this paper shows in an enlightening case.
By focusing on classification of new evidence we have shown that the conservative updating leads to a very effi cient implementation, also for multiply connected nets, so the new developments can immediately be exploited in real environments. Furthermore, the related algorithm can be implemented easily and does not require changes in pre existing knowledge bases, so that existing expert systems can be upgraded to make our robust, conservative, infer ences with minimal changes.
The proposed updating strategy is different in one impor tant respect from the more traditional ones: it generally leads only to partially determinate inferences and deci sions, and ultimately to systems that can recognise the lim its of their knowledge, and suspend judgement when these limits are reached. As necessary consequences of our re fusal to make unwarranted assumptions, we believe that these limitations are important characteristics of the way systems ought to operate in the real world. A system that, in a certain state, cannot support any decision on the ba sis of its knowledge base, will induce a user to look for further sources of information externally to the system. In contrast, systems that may make arbitrary choices without making that evident, will wrongly lead a user to think that these choices are well motivated.
An important subject for future research is the identifica tion of common intermediate states of knowledge about the incompleteness mechanism, that can be usefully modelled to derive stronger inferences and decisions than the ones described here. For Bayesian nets, one could think of par titioning the set of attributes in those for which MAR holds and the rest for which the mechanism is unknown. Such hy brid modelling seems a good compromise between gener ality and flexibility. It is also very useful to consider the ex tension of our treatment for Bayesian networks to the more general notion of a credal network [1] . Credal nets extend Bayesian nets in that they allow for imprecise probabil ity models (sets of probability distributions). They permit much more flexible modelling by weakening the require ment that prior knowledge should be represented by a pre cise probability distribution. Recent investigations make us confident about the extension of the present work to credal networks.
